Abstract. Analytic philosophy has been the most influential philosophical movement in 20th century philosophy. It has surely contributed like no other movement to the elucidation and demarcation of philosophical problems. Nonetheless, the empiricist and sometimes even nominalist convictions of orthodox analytic philosophers have served them to inadequately render even philosophers they consider their own and to propound very questionable conceptions.
Introduction
Analytic philosophy has been without any doubt the most influential philosophical movement in 20 th century philosophy. In fact, it has most surely contributed like no other movement in the history of philosophy to the elucidation and demarcation of philosophical problems. Certainly, the self-imposed rigour of most analytic philosophy-with the exception of the English ordinary language philosophers, of which here nothing else will be said-and the use of logical tools in philosophy has without doubt elevated the discussion of philosophical problems in many areas of philosophy. Nonetheless, the use of the word "analytic" in analytic philosophy is not uniformly applied. Analytic philosophy is usually traced back to Frege's views both on the philosophy of logic and mathematics, and to his semantic insights. Russell, Carnap, Quine and many leading figures of what could be called "orthodox analytic philosophy" see themselves as continuators of the same tradition inaugurated by Frege. However, such predominant trend in so-called analytic philosophy is permeated by a commitment to one or another sort of empiricism-and even nominalism-, which are totally foreign to Frege's views. In fact, the so-called Ockham's Razor, according to which one should not postulate the existence of entities that are not strictly indispensable, has been considered since Russell as the first commandment of orthodox analytic philosophy. Thus, in order to see Frege as their grandfather, empiricist philosophers had the extremely difficult task of trying to accommodate Frege's views to their ideology. Moreover, they felt compelled to reject any other philosopher or philosophical trend that could not be accommodated to their empiricist ideology. Hence, they both neglected valuable work that was not done by members of the empiricist church, while transforming, or better, deforming the philosophical work of others in order to make it presentable to an empiricist audience. So was born the dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy, the latter a sort of wastebasket in which the most dissimilar philosophical trends found their "final destination". In this sense, empiricists in philosophy are very similar to Marxist-leninists in the political arena: non-empiricist philosophers should not be read and if possible ostracized, very especially those concerned with similar issues, but under different presuppositions.
Such an attitude against other philosophical trends has both served orthodox analytic philosophers to give completely inadequate and even biased renderings of recent philosophers-even of those they consider their own-, and to propound conceptions that are clearly non-starters and that could very well had been prevented had they taken seriously philosophers they have preferred to ignore or to see through blinkers.
Some Examples of Historical Distortions
Let us begin with the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The first thing to be said about that thesis is that it lacks a referent. There is no such thing as the Duhem-Quine thesis. There is a very reasonable thesis of Duhem about the impossibility of isolating hypotheses in physics, with the immediate consequence of the non-existence of crucial experiments in physics. 1 That thesis concerns exclusively physics, not even the other natural sciences, and, of course, does not concern logic or mathematics. It is based on the fact that to submit a physical hypothesis to experimentation and possible refutation the physicist needs to make use of instruments designed on the basis of physical laws. No matter how well established those laws are, it is not excluded that one of them is false and that the negative outcome of the experiment is due not to the hypothesis under scrutiny but to that law. In contrast with what happens in physics, in the other natural sciences one makes use of instruments not belonging to the same discipline but to physics and, thus, the biologist or physiologist makes an act of faith with regard to physics and is able to isolate the biological or physiological hypothesis from any law of the same discipline. On the other hand, there is a completely unfounded thesis of Quine 2 about the connection of all our beliefs in a so-called web of belief, according to which all statements, from the most trivial logical or arithmetical statements to statements such as that Newton had a toothache when he discovered the law of gravitation are connected, none of them is either analytic or a priori, thus, any of them can be refuted by experience, though we on purely pragmatic grounds prefer to save from refutation the logical and mathematical statements in the centre of our web of belief, while making those in the periphery responsible for any anomalies. 4 in which he discusses one of their differences, namely, that for Frege concepts were referents of conceptual words, whereas for Husserl they were senses of conceptual words (using Frege's better known terminology). There was another more important difference with respect to the referent of statements, but that does not concern us here.
Philosophie der Arithmetik was in some sense a dead born child. It was an extension of Husserl's professorship's thesis of 1887, and represented Husserl's views probably up to 1889. Nonetheless, that youth book is not guilty of many of the exaggerations attributed to it by Frege in his late review of 1894. It contained a mild Brentanian psychologism that was supposed to be counterbalanced by a planned second volume concerned with logical foundations of arithmetic. The project of a second volume was abandoned probably a little after the publication of the first volume. If you examine Husserl's writings of that period, some important ones published only posthumously, as is the case of his Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie (Husserl 1983) , you observe a constant evolution. 5 In fact, already by 1894-the year of Frege's infamous review-Husserl arrived at his mature view of logic and mathematics presented for the first time in his Logische Untersuchungen and since then maintained by him all his life. 6 To say it very briefly, for him logic and mathematics were related not as mother and daughter but as sisters. Mathematics is not derived from logic, as in Frege's views, and logic is not ontological as is mathematics. Logic is a discipline in the realm of senses, that in its first level protects against nonsense, in its second level protects against countersense or contradiction, and in its third level is concerned with the notion of truth and similar semantic concepts, whereas mathematics is a formal ontology, a theory of structures with its mother structures as in the Bourbaki school, being the other mathematical structures either specializations of the most general structures, or combinations of them, or combinations of their specializations. Moreover, that ontological mathematics merges with logic in Husserl's version of the mathesis universalis, then crowning the edifice by a sort of theory of all possible theories. Such a conception of logic and mathematicsthe latter a generalization of Riemann's views 7 and a forerunner of Bourbaki's (see Bourbaki 1950 )-, has nothing to do with the much simpler Fregean conception. A third case of historical distortion is the interpretation of Frege by Anglo-American scholars. According to the main trend in Fregean scholarship in English speaking countries, Frege was after all a Kantian or neo-Kantian, and primarily an epistemologist. 8 Such a rendering is based almost exclusively on the fact that Frege coincided with Kant with respect to his conception of geometry as a synthetic a priori science based on intuition. However, there end the coincidences. Even the arguments brought by Frege on behalf of his view of geometry are different from Kant's. Moreover, Frege forcefully rejects Kant's conception of arithmetic as synthetic a priori, and the central part of his work is concerned precisely with showing that his logicist views on arithmetic are correct and, hence, Kant's are false. 9 Moreover, in multiple passages of his Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik and elsewhere Frege-who was primarily a philosopher of mathematics-makes it clear that he is a rationalist and Platonist in the best Leibnizian tradition (see Frege 1884 and 1918 ). Kant's mathematical constructivism, and the grounding of non-geometrical mathematics on the forms of sensibility of the human subject 10 are completely foreign to Frege.
But a still more alienated rendering of Frege is that of Jamie Tappenden (see Tap- penden 1995, 2006) , who conceives the history of mathematics in Germany in the nineteenth century as a cowboys versus Indians film. On the one hand, there are the cowboys-the good ones-of the Göttingen school founded by Gauß and presumably solidified by Riemann. On the other hand, there are the bad guys, the Indians, from the Berlin school of Weierstraß and Kronecker. Hence, since Frege studied in Göttingen (and also in Jena), he has to be somehow a Riemannian. Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is not only that Frege never referred to Riemann in his writingsand there is no evidence that Frege ever read Riemann's revolutionary monograph Über die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zugrude liegen-, and, moreover, Frege not only rejected non-Euclidean geometry in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik for its lack of intuitivity, but in a posthumously published paper (Frege 1969 ) compared nonEuclidean geometry to alchemy and astrology, and wanted it ostracized from the scientific realm. On the other side of the coin were the poor Indians, Cantor, Husserl and Minkowski, who had the "misfortune" of having studied with Kronecker and very especially with chief Weierstraß. The case of Husserl is even worst, since he was also Weierstraß' assistant. Nonetheless, it was the Indian Husserl who was strongly influenced by Riemann, not only, as already mentioned, by developing a conception of mathematics as a generalization of Riemann's views, but by accepting already by the end of 1892 Riemann's conception of physical space as empirical, distinguishing with Riemann between the formal study of geometrical manifolds of any number of dimensions and curvature, and the investigations on the nature of physical space, which are and have to be empirical 11 Hence, Husserl rejected already in 1892 Kant's aprioricity of both the three-dimensionality and the Euclidicity of space.
A last example of a historical distortion we want to discuss here is the case of the interpretations of Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt, from now on Aufbau (Carnap 1928) , and Husserl's influence on that book. The case of the young Carnap is certainly the most complex and delicate, since already in Aufbau and during the rest of his life Carnap himself deliberately tried to mask Husserl's influence. Only in his dissertation, Der Raum (Carnap 1922) , published in 1922 is Husserl's influence perfectly acknowledged. In that small book Husserl is referred to many times and always positively. In fact, Der Raum was written by someone who, not only had a very good knowledge of Husserl's views, but by someone that at that moment considered himself Husserl's disciple. Nonetheless, in his so-called Intellectual Autobiography of 1963 (see Carnap 1963) , Carnap says that it were Kant and the neo-Kantians, especially Natorp and Cassirer who exerted a decisive philosophical influence on Der Raum. It was Adolf Grünbaum, in his commentary on Der Raum in the same volume (Grünbaum 1963) , who mentioned Husserl's influence on that small book and forced Carnap to accept in his 'Reply to Grünbaum' 12 
Ignorance and Prejudice
After 1926 when he went to Vienna Carnap seemed to have developed some sort of intellectual amnesia, not only with respect to Husserl's influence but also with respect to philosophical knowledge. Thus, he forgot Husserl's and his own criticism of Machian-Russellian positivist-empiricist views, and took active part in the discussion on protocol sentences, in which presumably one wanted the simple facts to speak for themselves be it in its physicalist or in its phenomenalist version. On the other hand, if Carnap and others had studied the non-empiricist Duhem carefully they would have not engaged in such a discussion about protocol sentences. As Duhem puts it (see, for example, Duhem 1894), in physical science there are certainly experiments, but they are not as simple and naive as the logical-positivists and, before them, for example, Claude Bernard, as mentioned by Duhem, believed. Even the simplest physical experiences in laboratory are theory-laden. What the physicist (or chemist) 'sees' in the laboratory is not what the layman casually invited to the laboratory observes. Such 'observations' are automatically interpreted by the specialist on the basis of theoretical knowledge serving as basis even in the design of the experiment. Such is the basis of the empirical knowledge used in the physical sciences, not the so-called protocol sentences, be it in their physicalist or in its phenomenalist version. The whole debate on protocol sentences was a complete waste of time.
Logical-positivists hoped that on the basis of the so-called protocol sentences they could obtain physical laws by induction, and in this way the verification of physical laws could be reduced to the direct verification of protocol sentences. It is unnecessary to mention here how trivial logical arguments destroyed the logical-positivists' program, as well as their variants using falsification or confirmation instead of verification, and even the more sophisticated Carnapian program of the observational and theoretical languages did not survive. In fact, already the design of the whole logical-positivist program, based on empiricist prejudices, was a non-starter, though the empiricist blinkers did not allow them to see it. A careful study precisely of Duhem's views on physical theories would probably have helped them discover their error (Duhem 1894, p.90-1 is an explanatory science and is a theoretical endeavour similar to mathematics, in which contrary to sciences like history, the decisive nexus is that of truths. Husserl clearly distinguishes between laws of low level, obtained more or less by some sort of induction, and genuine physical laws, which are of a theoretical nature and are called by Husserl "hypotheses cum fundamento in re". Husserl's preferred example of a hypothesis cum fundamento in re is Newton's law of gravitation. Such theoretical laws-in contrast to logical and mathematical laws, which are free of any link to experience-are linked, though only tenuously, to experience. They are not obtained by induction, but are introduced in order to explain the laws of low level originating in experience. By the way, Husserl obtained the deductive-nomological model for the explanation of laws of low level many years before Popper and Hempel. Such theoretical laws of higher level are not only tenuously linked to experience, but are in no way uniquely determined by the low level laws they are supposed to explain. There exists an indefinite number of possible hypotheses cum fundamento in re that could also explain the same low level law, that is, for example, hypotheses cum fundamento in re that are empirically equivalent to the law of gravitation but theoretically different from it. Thus, the laws of higher level are underdetermined by experience. Hence, Husserl obtained the underdetermination of physical theories-sometimes attributed to Quine-many decades before its introduction by analytic philosophers in the discussion of empirical theories. Once more, if logical-empiricists and other empiricist analytic philosophers had read Husserl carefully they would have avoided much effort that resulted in nothing fruitful.
Empiricism, Nominalism and Logic
We have already mentioned that very simple logic helped defeat the verificationism and its variants of logical positivism. But logical positivism was after all one of the most liberal versions of empiricism. One can very well suspect that other more radical forms of empiricism, for example Quine's or Mill's are non-starters in the philosophy of science and, generally, in philosophy. But paradoxically empiricists seem to be unable to learn from experience. Some of them have seen the Platonist demons in higher-order logic, and have tried to limit logic to first-order logic. They have found some comfort in adopting Quine's dictum that to be is to be the value of a quantified variable. Thus, since first-order logic quantifies only over individuals, you can continue being an empiricist and be a nominalist. In fact, empiricism and nominalism are near cousins. Things, however, are not so smooth as nominalists and Quineans would like. First-order logic has by far the most developed semantics of any logic, and that semantics consists of structures and families of structures of all infinite cardinalities in virtue of Tarski's so-called Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. You do not quantify over them, but your whole first-order semantics presupposes their existence. By the way, Quine abandoned the nominalism of his younger years and accepted a sort of moderate realism for mathematical entities, according to which you have to acknowledge the existence of those mathematical entities postulated by mathematical theories applicable to physical science. Thus, the entities postulated by the remaining non-applied mathematics do not exist. Such a moderate physicalist realism of mathematical entities based on the so-called "indispensability argument" has, however, some difficulties. It has as a consequence that mathematical entities have properties very similar to living creatures, namely, they are born at a determinate temporal point and could very well die. Thus, tensors were born when Einstein and Hilbert independently of each other discovered the general theory of relativity. Other mathematical entities, for example, some abstract ones postulated by universal algebra or category theory have still not been born, though one can still hope that they will finally be born. For the moment, however, at least parts of those areas of mathematics are no more than a game similar to chess. On the other hand, if a mathematical theory ceases to be applied in physical science, the entities postulated by that theory would die. I consider all those consequences of Quine's moderate realism absurd enough, so that the theory itself does not merit further consideration.
But certainly among empiricists there are more consistent and staunch nominalists that would not accept even Quine's moderate realism. However, if you are a true nominalist and do not accept the existence of mathematical entities, then you have to consider any existential statement purporting to talk about mathematical entities as false and universal statements purporting to talk about mathematical entities as vacously true. Nonetheless, there is an important theorem in classical first-order model theory, namely, Robinson's Model-Completeness Test, which states, among other things, that a theory is model-complete-that is, substructures of models of the theory are always elementary substructures-if and only if for any existential statement in the language of the theory, there exists a universal statement in the same language that is equivalent to it. Hence, if an existential statement is false, then there is a universal one equivalent to it and, thus, false, and, conversely, their negations, which are respectively equivalent to a universal and to an existential statement, are true. Thus, there are true existential statements. Therefore, in virtue of the Model-Completeness Test, nominalism is false. Moreover, once more in virtue of the Model-Completeness Test, conventionalism in mathematics is also false, since one cannot make all existential statements false and all universal statements true, or the other way around. As a corollary, one can also conclude that Carnap's Principle of Tolerance, according to which, among other things, you are in complete liberty to choose a Platonist or a nominalist language, is also refuted. Classical (first-order) model theory is incompatible with the Principle of Tolerance.
Finally, among empiricists there have been some that have tried to argue on behalf of first-order logic and against second-and higher-order logic by referring to some desirable properties of first-order logic and contrasting the latter with the lack of such properties in higher-order logic. Let us examine some of those arguments. They certainly cannot reasonably refer to the fact that first-order logic has a very rich model theory, because that model theory consists precisely of abstract structures of any infinite cardinality. They can, however, refer to semantic completeness, the fact that first-order syntax is capable of properly covering first-order semantics, whereas that is not the case with classical-I would say "genuine"-second-order logic. Nonetheless, decidability and categoricity are also very desirable meta-mathematical properties, but first-order logic-except for its small monadic segment-is not decidable, whereas mathematical theories that are usually categorical are not categorical when expressed in the language of first-order logic. Those theories are, however, categorical when expressed in second-order logic. No matter what the defenders of first-order logic say, that is a clear sign of the inadequacy to express mathematical theories in first-order logic. Hence, one has to balance the positive and negative aspects of both logics without blinkers when comparing them and should not be in any hurry to condemn second-order logic.
Another popular argument wielded by defenders of first-order logic against second-order logic is that the former has only one semantics, whereas the latter has multiple semantics. Presumably, second-order logic allows besides its classical semantics a multi-sorted semantics and Henkin's semantics, which admits truncated models and served him to obtain a Weak Semantic Completeness Theorem. Nonetheless, 20 once more one should not hurry to conclusions and interpret such presumed facts as a clear victory for first-order logic. In fact, there is no victory at all. Many-sorted second-order semantics is equivalent to Henkin's deviant semantics, 21 thus, reducing the number of semantics for second-order logic to two. Moreover, Henkin's semantics for second-order logic was introduced in order to prove the Weak Semantic Completeness Theorem. But once you have semantic completeness, you can obtain, as corollaries both the Compactnes Theorem and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. There is, however, an extremely important result in abstract model theory, namely, Lindström's First Characterization Theorem, 22 which states that any extension of first-order logic for which both the Compactness Theorem and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem are valid is equivalent to first-order logic. Hence, what Henkin's Weak Semantic Completeness Theorem accomplishes is a reduction of second-order logic to first-order logic. Therefore, it is not the case that second-order logic properly has a diversity of semantics. The argument against second-order logic based on the multiplicity of semantics has been refuted.
